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Abstract 
Although it is widely acknowledged that political parties operate in a system of party 
interdependence, little is known about whether party selectors’ decisions to select ethnic 
minority aspirants is affected by previous selection strategies and motives of other parties, a 
process referred to as diffusion. Drawing on a survey experiment conducted among Flemish 
local party chairs, this study tests whether party selectors are more likely to select ethnic 
minority aspirants when they are made aware that doing so has previously yielded electoral 
benefits for some of their competitors (‘competition’), or that by doing so they adhere to social 
norms (‘emulation’). Contradictory to research examining the diffusion of female candidacies, 
only little evidence is found that diffusion affects the selection of ethnic minority candidates. 
Emulation had a general, but weak, positive effect on the selection of ethnic minority 
candidates, whereas the influence of competition was restricted to leftist and less electorally 
successful parties. These limited effects can be explained by the high supply of ethnic minority 
aspirants provided in the experiment, but also by the specific inclusion dilemmas associated 
with selection ethnic minorities. These are strongly party- and context-specific, which makes 
parties less likely to respond to other parties’ strategies.  
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1 Introduction 
Political parties are crucial contributors to the under-representation of ethnic minorities, 
which is considered as one of the major democratic deficits of current democracies. By failing 
to take the interests of under-represented groups at heart as well as to motivate them to 
participate in the political recruitment process, unrepresentative institutions undermine their 
own legitimacy (Martin, 2016; Phillips, 1995). Political parties can diminish these deficits by 
selecting more diverse candidates, by assigning diverse candidates to realistic list positions or 
districts and by supporting their electoral campaign (Janssen, Erzeel, & Celis, 2020; Shah, 
2014). 
Scholars examining parties’ strategies regarding the selection of ethnic minority 
candidates have thus far examined which party and district characteristics shape parties’ 
decision to include ethnic minority candidates as though they were operating in a vacuum 
(Dancygier, 2017; Farrer & Zingher, 2018; Janssen et al., 2020; Tolley, 2019; van der Zwan, 
Tolsma, & Lubbers, 2020; Van Trappen, Vandeleene, & Wauters, 2021). However, parties 
operate in a system of party interdependence, which implies that a party’s selection strategies 
can be influenced by the prior selection strategies of other parties, a process which is referred 
to as diffusion (Gilardi, 2012; Matland & Studlar, 1996).  
A study of Shah (2014) indirectly showed how diffusion could affect the selection of 
ethnic minorities. She argued that ethnic minority candidates are more likely to emerge in 
districts where ethnic minority candidates have previously run than in districts where no ethnic 
minority candidate has ever run before. This correlation was framed from a supply-side 
perspective. Running as an ethnic minority candidate in an electoral district when no other 
ethnic minority candidate has done so before is considered to be a significant initial hurdle 
which ethnic minority aspirants need to overcome. Once this hurdle is passed, more ethnic 
minority aspirants will come forward as previous ethnic minority candidacies signal the 
readiness of the electoral district for more political diversity. The correlation between previous 
ethnic minority candidacies and the emergence of present ethnic minority candidates can 
instead also be looked at from a demand-side perspective. When a political party nominates 
ethnic minority candidates on their list, this could incentivize other parties to enhance the 
representation of ethnic minorities on their list as well.  
This paper offers a first step in bridging the diffusion literature and the literature on ethnic 
minority representation by examining how the selection strategies of different parties are 
connected. It departs from insights derived from studies focusing on the diffusion of policies in 
general and the diffusion of female candidacies and gender quota in particular. Two issues are 
scrutinized in this paper. First, why are political parties responsive to the selection strategies 
and motives of other parties? Both competition and emulation are expected to influence parties’ 
responsiveness to other parties. The former implies that parties adopt a logic of consequences 
and are influenced by selection strategies which appear to increase their electoral 
competitiveness. Alternatively, the latter means that parties’ adopt a logic of appropriateness 
and are inspired by the normative implications associated with other parties’ selection 
strategies. Second, this paper addresses whether some parties are more responsive to the 
strategies of other parties than others. Attention is paid to parties’ ideological predisposition to 
select ethnic minority candidates, their electoral strength and their previous experience with 
selecting ethnic minority candidates.  
To these ends, a survey experiment was conducted among local party chairs in Flanders. 
An experimental approach was chosen because real-life data are less suited to measure diffusion 
in terms of the selection of candidates as they generally fail to account for the role of aspirant 
supply. Furthermore, real-life data are also less suited to attribute changes in party’s behaviour 
to different diffusion mechanisms (Butler, Volden, Dynes, & Shor, 2017; Maggetti & Gilardi, 
2016). The participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups. The first 
group was shown a short hypothetical journal article which included information about the 
electoral appeal of ethnic minority candidates who had previously run for other parties in their 
electoral district. The second group had to read an article about the democratic norms which 
led other parties to select ethnic minority candidates in the past, and the article presented to the 
third group discussed the campaign expenses of local parties. The first two articles allowed to 
measure diffusion based on respectively competition and emulation. The respondents assigned 
to the third article acted as the control group. After having read the article, the participants were 
asked to compose a candidate list of 9 candidates to be chosen from a fixed list of 20 potential 
candidates, including 4 ethnic minority aspirants.  
The analysis of the experimental data revealed that diffusion is not a dominant driver of 
the selection of ethnic minority candidates. In general, participants assigned to the ‘emulation’ 
treatment selected slightly more ethnic minority aspirants than the participants assigned to the 
control group. The ‘competition’ treatment, in turn, only had an effect on specific parties. 
Compared to their rightist and more electorally successful counterparts, both leftist and less 
electorally successful parties selected significantly more ethnic minority candidates when being 
made aware that doing so had previously been an electorally successful strategy for other parties 
in their district. The difference between more and less successful parties was, however, only 
statistically significant among participants in moderately diverse municipalities.  
 On the one hand, these results could be an underestimating of real-life diffusion effects 
as the large supply of ethnic minority aspirants presented in the experiment made it easy for all 
party selectors to diversify their lists. On the other hand, there are reasons to assume that 
diffusion in general plays a smaller role for ethnic minority candidates than for female 
candidates given that the ethnic inclusion dilemmas parties are faced with are highly party- and 
context-specific (Dancygier, 2017). This makes it more difficult for parties to translate the 
experience other parties have with ethnic minority candidates to their own party. 
2 The selection of ethnic minority candidates and the role of 
diffusion 
That political actors, whether defined as parties, governments or organizations, do not 
operate in a vacuum but in networks, and that as a result their strategies, policies and decisions 
(hereafter in short: strategies) are interdependent was already recognized in the late 19th century 
and is currently known as diffusion or contagion1 (Gilardi, 2012). Diffusion patterns have been 
demonstrated for a wide variety of political phenomena, including policies (Gilardi, 2010), 
electoral systems (Bol, Pilet, & Riera, 2015) and regime contention (Bamert, Gilardi, & 
Wasserfallen, 2015). 
The diffusion literature offers important opportunities to enhance the scholarly insight 
into candidate selection processes as well. As parties are generally uncertain about the 
consequences of new selection strategies, they are expected to rely on informational shortcuts, 
including the perceived consequences of other parties’ strategies, to estimate whether some 
strategies are beneficial or not. Starting with Matland and Studlar (1996), several scholars have 
provided evidence about how diffusion affects parties’ decisions to select female candidates or 
to adopt gender quota (Cowell-Meyers, 2011, 2014; Meier, 2004; Simón & Verge, 2017). 
Attention has been paid to both diffusion between parties within the same electoral district on 
the one hand and diffusion between parties operating in different electoral districts within 
(Matland & Studlar, 1996) or across countries (Huang, 2015; Hughes, Krook, & Paxton, 2015) 
on the other hand. The insights presented in this paper are restricted to the former, which 
Matland and Studlar (1996) refer to as micro-contagion. As ethnic minority communities are 
unevenly distributed across electoral districts and the openness of ethnic majority voters equally 
differs between electoral districts, it is highly presumable that, parties will first and foremost 
respond to the diversifying selection strategies of their direct competitors rather than to look at 
parties operating in distinctive contexts.  
                                                 
1 Whereas scholars generally use the concepts diffusion and contagion interchangeably (Graham, Shipan, & 
Volden, 2013; Most & Starr, 1990), some distinguish between the two (Cliff & First, 2013). For consistency, the 
term diffusion is used throughout this paper.  
When it comes to the question why strategies diffuse, two distinct yet related 
classifications of diffusion mechanisms are commonly used in the literature (Gilardi, 2012). 
The first type of classification distinguishes between a logic of consequences and a logic of 
appropriateness. Whereas the former implies that strategies are altered when the strategies of 
others appear useful to achieve certain desirable results, the latter refers to strategy adaptations 
driven by ideas about normatively appropriate behaviour (March & Olsen, 1998; Pollitt, 2001).  
The second type of classification differentiates between competition, emulation and 
learning. Competition implies that political actors adapt their strategies based on the strategies 
of other actors because they compete for the same resources. For instance, when one 
government introduces a reduction of corporate tax rates, other governments will be likely to 
follow suit to remain competitive. When political actors are made aware that adopting similar 
strategies is socially appropriate and therefore start to adapt their own strategies, emulation is 
at play. For instance, after several democratic countries had introduced election monitoring, 
other countries followed suit to signal their commitment to democratization (Gilardi, 2012). 
Competition and emulation therefore closely resemble a logic of consequences and a logic of 
appropriateness respectively. Learning, finally, means that political actors gain knowledge 
about the consequences associated with a strategy. When contemplating whether to introduce 
smoking bans in bars and restaurants, for example, governments can learn from trends in the 
cigarette consumption in other countries where antismoking laws have already been 
implemented. However, although in theory, learning constitutes a separate mechanism, it 
cannot always be perfectly discerned from competition and emulation as sometimes it is defined 
as gaining knowledge about how political actors can increase their competitiveness (Gilardi, 
2010), whereas other scholars define learning as obtaining information about the socially 
appropriateness of adopting certain strategies (Glasius, Schalk, & De Lange, 2020). Therefore, 
depending on the context, a classification consisting of only two mechanisms seems more 
appropriate.  
In relation to parties’ diversifying selection strategies, both competition and emulation 
are likely to explain why parties (further) diversify their candidate lists when others have 
previously done so. Because parties are both vote-seeking (Downs, 1957) and concerned about 
their legitimacy and party image (Ignazi, 2014; Johns, Mitchell, Denver, & Pattie, 2009), they 
can be expected to diversify their candidate pool when they think this will increase their vote 
share and/or legitimacy. Therefore, both competition and emulation can be expected to be 
important drivers of the adoption of diversifying strategies. In line with the previous paragraph, 
considering learning as a separate mechanism would distort a clear delineation between parties’ 
selection motives as parties can learn from both the electoral and normative consequences of 
other parties’ selections strategies (Simón & Verge, 2017). Studies focusing on the diffusion of 
female candidacies and gender quota have confirmed the effect of both competition and 
emulation (Muriaas & Kayuni, 2013). On the one hand, once a successful innovating party 
shows that selecting female candidates does not result in an electoral penalty, or can even 
contribute to a party’s electoral success, more established parties are likely to follow suit (Caul, 
2001; Matland & Studlar, 1996). On the other hand, parties equally respond to pressures to 
comply with social norms about gender equality and women’s representation (Cowell-Meyers, 
2011; Meier, 2004; Simón & Verge, 2017).  
Although the selection of ethnic minority candidates has not yet been approached from a 
diffusion perspective, research has pointed out that when deciding whether and which kind of 
ethnic minority candidates to include on their list, political parties take both electoral and 
normative incentives into account. Dancygier (2017) in this regard distinguishes between vote-
based and symbolic inclusion. Vote-based inclusion of ethnic minority candidates emerges 
when a party can attract more voters than it can lose by selecting ethnic minority candidates. 
This is primarily the case in ethnically diverse electoral districts. Symbolic inclusion appears 
when parties want to boost their party image by appearing as a non-racist and minority-
supporting party. The (anticipated) electoral consequences of symbolic inclusion are limited, as 
it is only expected to attract a small number of cosmopolitan voters. When translating vote-
based and symbolic inclusion patterns to a context in which political parties interact, they 
closely resemble competition and emulation. Therefore, I hypothesize that:  
- H1a: party selectors are more likely to select ethnic minority candidates when they are 
aware that competitors have done so in the past and this has yielded electoral benefits. 
-  H1b: party selectors are more likely to select ethnic minority candidates when they are 
made aware that by doing so they act in accordance with present democratic norms. 
Besides examining why diffusion occurs, scholars have addressed the question in which 
contexts and among which political actors diffusion is more likely to occur. Research focusing 
on the diffusion of gender quota and the selection of female candidates have primarily addressed 
the role of party systems and the role of party leadership exclusiveness. When it comes to 
diffusion between parties in the same electoral district, Matland and Studlar (1996) argued that 
multi-party proportional representation (PR) systems offer better opportunities than 
majoritarian systems. Because majoritarian systems tend be single-member district plurality 
systems which are dominated by two parties, the latter may feel less pressured by small 
innovating parties. Furthermore, the potential costs associated with selecting a female candidate 
are higher than in PR systems where parties can balance their ticket. Additionally, parties 
characterized by strong organizational structures and exclusive selectorates are more responsive 
to diffusion pressures as their leadership can steer the course of the party (Cowell-Meyers, 
2011; Kenny & Mackay, 2014). In this paper, I choose to hold these factors constant, as will be 
discussed in sections 3 and 4, and instead move to the potential effect of three other party 
characteristics derived from the diffusion literature which are likely to affect parties’ sensibility 
to diffusion pressures.  
First, leftist parties can be expected to be more sensible to diffusion pressures regarding 
the selection of ethnic minority candidates than rightist parties (Kenny & Mackay, 2014; Simón 
& Verge, 2017). To start, parties are more inclined to respond to the strategies adopted by other 
parties when they are ideologically predisposed to adopting a certain strategy than when they 
are predisposed against this strategy (Butler et al., 2017). Notwithstanding recent findings that 
rightist parties are increasingly committed to ensuring ethnic minority representation, even in 
districts with small ethnic minority populations (Sobolewska, 2013), leftist parties remain 
stronger advocates of equal access to political power for marginalised groups, including ethnic 
minorities (Bird, Saalfeld, & Wüst, 2011; Marcos-Marne, 2017). Consequently, leftist parties 
can be expected to be more sensible to both competition and emulation pressures than rightist 
parties. Furthermore, leftist parties are more popular among ethnic minority voters than rightist 
voters (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Strijbis, 2014). Therefore, when other parties start to select 
ethnic minority candidates, leftist parties might feel that their electoral appeal among ethnic 
minority and cosmopolitan voters and their image as a minority-friendly party are both directly 
affected by these choices and that as a consequence they need to reconsider their own strategies. 
Rightist parties, which generally attract less ethnic minority voters, may feel less need to 
respond to such pressures as they assume they have less to gain by adapting their current 
selection decisions. 
- H2: Leftist parties are more sensible to competition and emulation pressures to select 
ethnic minority candidates than rightist parties. 
Second, previous studies have argued that electoral uncertainty and party competition 
positively affect the likelihood that diffusion occurs within a political system (Cowell-Meyers, 
2011). Translated to the party level, parties with a large vote share may be less likely to respond 
to the strategies by successful innovating parties, because their current strategies have already 
proven to be successful and because they may believe they are already perceived as legitimate 
by the electorate because of their electoral strength. Less successful or opposition parties, in 
turn, are more likely to adapt their strategies after suffering electoral losses (Put, Maddens, & 
Verleden, 2017). Therefore, they can be expected to respond more strongly to strategies of other 
parties which seem electorally beneficial (competition) and to a lesser degree also to strategies 
of other parties which seem to have increased their legitimacy and party image (emulation), as 
these factors could indirectly contribute to their electoral success (Krook, 2009; Simón & 
Verge, 2017).  
- H3: Parties which obtained a small vote share in the previous elections are more sensible 
to competition pressures and to a lesser degree also emulation pressures to select ethnic 
minority candidates than parties which obtained a large vote share.  
Third, parties’ responses to the selection decision of other parties are also likely to be 
affected by whether or not they have prior experience with a certain strategy. Previous research 
has in this regard pointed to the difference between learning from others’ experiences versus 
learning from one’s own experiences (Volden, Ting, & Carpenter, 2008). Parties which have 
nominated ethnic minority candidates in the past already know how the selection of ethnic 
minority candidates affects their vote share and/or party image and therefore do not need to rely 
on the experiences of other parties. For instance, when they know that selecting ethnic minority 
candidates could entail a loss of votes, they will refrain from selecting ethnic minority 
candidates even when selecting ethnic minority candidates appears to be a successful strategy 
for other parties. Equally, when they know that selecting ethnic minority candidates increases 
their vote share, they will do so regardless of the electoral effects other parties generated by 
selecting diverse candidates. Alternatively, parties which have not yet nominated ethnic 
minority candidates are dependent on the experiences of other parties to make inferences about 
the electoral and normative consequences selecting ethnic minority candidates will entail. 
- H4: Parties which did not select ethnic minority candidates in recent elections are more 
sensible to competition and emulation pressures to select ethnic minority candidates 
than parties which selected ethnic minority candidates in recent elections. 
3 The Flemish local context  
This paper examines the diffusion of ethnic minority candidacies in the context of 
Flanders, the Dutch-speaking and largest region of Belgium. The Belgian population has 
become increasingly ethnically diverse since the end of the Second World War, yet political 
institutions at all political levels and in all regions remain rather homogenous (Celis & Erzeel, 
2017; Janssen, Dandoy, & Erzeel, 2017; Van Trappen et al., 2021). Considering that this under-
representation is strongly shaped at the candidate selection stage, and that Belgium is 
characterized by multi-party PR systems at all political levels makes it a most-likely case for 
the diffusion of diversifying selection strategies (Matland & Studlar, 1996). Instead of the 
whole country, only the Flemish-speaking region is targeted in this study. As a result of the 
federalization of Belgium, the Belgian party system was split into a Flemish-speaking and 
French-speaking party system which operate rather autonomously from each other and are 
characterized by their own political culture (De Winter, Swyngedouw, & Dumont, 2006). By 
solely focussing on the Flemish context, the party system and political culture are held constant.  
The research population is further restricted to local parties instead of regional parties 
because the former are better suited to examine the diffusion of selection strategies within 
electoral districts. To start, for Flemish regional elections, Flanders is divided into five electoral 
districts. Because of these large electoral districts, which cancel out important distinctions in 
ethnic minority concentrations between municipalities, almost all parties participating in 
regional elections put ethnic minority candidates on their lists. Flemish local elections, in 
contrast, take place in 300 municipalities (and 9 districts within the city of Antwerp). Because 
the size of the ethnic minority population widely diverges across electoral districts, the 
proportion of ethnic minority candidates equally varies to a great extent. Whereas for the 2018 
local elections, 54% of the candidate lists affiliated with a regional party did not include any 
ethnic minority candidate, the most diverse lists counted more than 50% ethnic minority 
candidates (Van Trappen et al., 2021). Additionally, at the regional level, the impact of the 
central party leadership on the list composition is very strong and there is generally some 
coordination of the candidate selection process across electoral districts (Vandeleene, 
Dodeigne, & De Winter, 2016). At the local level, in contrast, the autonomy of local party 
branches is much bigger (De Winter, Erzeel, Vandeleene, & Wauters, 2013). Therefore, the 
‘most likely’ character of the Belgium context is most outspoken at the local level. 
4 Data and methods 
4.1 Survey experiment 
The diffusion of ethnic minority candidate selection was tested by means of a survey 
experiment. An experimental approach is best suited to overcome the two main challenges 
diffusion scholars are confronted with. First, researchers should make convincing claims that 
certain patterns are due to diffusion and are not the result of political actors responding to 
common chocks in a similar manner but independently from each other (Graham et al., 2013). 
Second, scholars need to differentiate separate diffusion mechanisms. Both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches based on real-life data generally fall short on at least one of these 
accounts. With real-life election data, it is hard to determine whether an increase of ethnic 
minority candidates in a particular party is inspired by prior selection strategies of other parties 
or whether this increase is due to other factors such as an increased supply of ethnic minority 
aspirants or a new party selectorate. Furthermore, quantitative studies are often confronted with 
a lack of suitable empirical data, which steers scholars towards using inaccurate proxies to 
measure diffusion mechanisms (Maggetti & Gilardi, 2016). For instance, the number of prior 
adoptions of a certain strategy has been used as a proxy for competition, emulation and learning 
(Gilardi, 2012). Although qualitative approaches are better suited to demonstrate causal 
relations and presumable also to detect different diffusion mechanisms, they are often aimed at 
finding ‘smoking gun’ evidence, which is generally hard to find (Starke, 2013). Such ‘smoking 
gun’ evidence is also unsuited to examine which political actors are more likely to respond to 
diffusion pressures than others. An experimental setting overcomes both problems. By 
controlling for the supply of aspirants, the experimental setting allows to make causal 
inferences. Additionally, the creation of clearly distinguishable experimental treatments greatly 
enhances the internal validity of the measurement of different diffusion mechanisms. 
The research population consisted of all local party chairs in Flanders who (have) presided 
over a local branch of six out of the seven regional parties represented in the Flemish 
Parliament. Vlaams Belang, the far-right party, did not wish to participate in this study. The 
party chairs were chosen as the research population as they constitute the primary party 
selectors at the local level (De Winter et al., 2013). 1,561 local party chairs were invited to 
participate in the survey experiment over 297 municipalities and the 9 local districts within the 
city of Antwerp.2 The party chairs were contacted via email. The email addresses were gathered 
via the party headquarters as part of the RepResent Local Chairs Survey 2018, and three parties 
provided updated contact lists (the liberal party, the regionalist party and the green party) in the 
beginning of October 2020. A first invitation was sent in the middle of October 2020, followed 
by a first reminder at the end of October 2020 and a final reminder in the middle of November 
                                                 
2 Not all regional parties have local branches in every municipality. 
2020. 615 local party chairs completed the survey experiment which resulted in a response rate 
of 39.40%. Appendix 1 contains information about the response rate per party. 
At the beginning of the survey experiment, the participants were randomly divided into 
three groups, each of which was presented a different hypothetical newspaper article. Two 
groups were assigned to the experimental treatments which measured the success of 
competition and emulation as diffusion mechanisms. The ‘competition’ treatment focussed on 
the electoral success that other parties in the electoral district of the participant enjoyed due to 
the presence of ethnic minority candidates on their list, whereas the ‘emulation’ treatment 
elaborated on the democratic norms associated with the diverse candidate lists previously 
composed by other parties in their electoral district. The control group was provided a 
hypothetical newspaper article about the general campaign expenses of local parties, a neutral 
topic which was expected not to affect party selectors’ intentions (not) to select ethnic minority 
candidates. All three articles are included in Appendix 2. After being presented one of the 
newspaper articles, the participants were asked to answer a multiple choice question about the 
content of the article. This question served to test whether the participants had understood the 
selection strategies of other parties, which is a condition for diffusion to emerge (Matland & 
Studlar, 1996). Only one respondent (0.16%) did not answer the content question correctly. 
The ‘competition’ and ‘emulation’ articles referred to respectively the electoral success 
and selection motives of ‘two other parties’ in the electoral district of the participant at times of 
the 2018 local elections, which took place two year prior to the experiment. Because, as in real 
life, parties are unable to anticipate their competitors’ current strategies, but are instead more 
likely to respond to the strategies they adopted in previous elections, the experimental 
conditions were framed accordingly (Simón & Verge, 2017). Furthermore, the articles 
deliberately referred to two parties instead of a single party to add weight to the message of the 
articles. In the 2018 local elections in Flanders, only 13 of the 300 (4.33%) municipalities 
counted less than three candidate lists and only one local party branch of a regional party present 
in these municipalities managed to obtain a vast majority of the votes (Agentschap Binnenlands 
Bestuur, 2018). Therefore, the reference to two competing parties is likely to be perceived as a 
realistic scenario by the participants. Finally, the identity of the parties mentioned in the 
newspaper articles was not specified for three reasons. First, although the seminal work of 
Matland and Studlar (1996) emphasised the catalysing role of small leftist parties, other scholars 
have shown that also other parties can initiate diffusion (Cowell-Meyers, 2011; Kenny & 
Mackay, 2014). Second, the ideological identity of the lists competing in local elections 
strongly diverges across and within municipalities over time due to the presence of cartel lists 
and the emergence of local lists which have less outspoken ideological profiles (Dodeigne, 
Jacquet, & Reuchamps, 2020; Heyerick, 2016). Specifying the party profiles would therefore 
result in a less realistic scenario for a part of the local party chairs. 
After having read the newspaper article, the participants were asked to imagine a 
hypothetical situation in which local elections would be held in a few months’ time and were 
invited to compose a hypothetical candidate list consisting of nine candidates for these 
elections. An English translation of the question wording can be found in Appendix 3. The 
candidates were to be chosen from a fixed pool of 20 aspirants who varied in terms of gender 
(man/women), ethnicity (Flemish/Moroccan name) and experience (incumbent/active party 
member). The lists were thus fairly short, as in real-life local elections in Flanders candidate 
lists may include on average 24,66 candidates maximum. This restriction in list length was 
necessary because only limited information could be given about the potential candidates to 
ensure that the selection of ethnic minority candidates could be ascribed to their ethnic 
background. It would be too difficult a task to ask the party chairs to compose a realistic list of 
more than 20 candidates based on such limited information. Moroccan names were used to 
denote ethnic minority candidates because the Maghrebi community is the most prominent 
visible ethnic minority group in Flanders whose political representation is one of the most 
debated (Janssen, Dandoy, & Erzeel, 2017). Four aspirants were assigned a Moroccan name, 
which resulted in a high supply of ethnic minority aspirants. As such the experimental design 
provided another necessary conditions for diffusion to emerge. Parties not only have to 
understand the selection strategies of other parties, they also have to be able to adapt their 
strategies (Matland & Studlar, 1996). The participants were also asked to comply with the legal 
gender quotas present in Flanders3 when drawing their list. 36 of the 615 respondents (5.85%) 
did not respect the quota legislation. After having drawn their lists, the participants were asked 
what they thought to be the research objective of the experiment. 11 participants (1.79%) rightly 
guessed that the objective of the experiment was to test their response to the newspaper article.  
The questionnaire ended with some questions about the party selectors and their local 
party. One of these questions is used as one the main predictor variables in this study: party 
                                                 
3 Candidate lists should be composed of an equal number of male and female candidates and the two first list 
positions may not be occupied by candidates of the same sex.  
selectors’ ideological placement of their local party branch. This was measured on a seven-
point scale (1=very leftist, 7=very rightist). 
4.2 Variables 
The dependent variable measures the percentage of ethnic minority aspirants which were 
selected as candidates on a scale from one to zero. As four ethnic minority aspirants were 
present, a score of 0.5 for instance implies that two of the four ethnic minority aspirants were 
selected. Although in proportional list systems, party selectors cannot only foster the 
representation of ethnic minorities by selecting ethnic minority candidates, but also by granting 
them higher list positions, this study only looks at the presence of these candidates on the lists. 
Considering that the candidate lists composed during the experiment counted only nine 
candidates, the data are unsuited to make predictions about the ‘visible’ or ‘eligible’ list 
positions of the ethnic minority candidates. Furthermore, only 15 of the 651 participants 
selected an ethnic minority candidate as the head of list, which equally makes it impossible to 
estimate possible diffusion effects on this account. 
The independent variables capture whether the participants were assigned to the 
‘competition’ treatment (N=205), ‘emulation’ treatment (N=201), or the control group 
(N=209). To test hypotheses two to four, three additional variables were included. First, the 
ideological position of the participants’ local party was included as a scale variable (1=very 
leftist, 7=very rightist). Second, for participants who participated with their own party (cartel 
lists excluded) in the 2018 local elections (N=475), information about their vote share was 
gathered from official government sources (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur, 2018). 
Considering that the relationship between parties’ vote share and the dependent variable was 
not linear for all treatment groups, parties’ vote share was included as a categoric instead of a 
numeric variable. A distinction was made between parties which obtained less than 10% of the 
votes (N=110), parties which obtained between 11% and 20% of the votes (N=173), parties 
which obtained between 21% and 30% of the votes (N=98) and parties which obtained more 
than 30% of the votes (N=94). Third, again those participants who participated with their own 
party in the 2018 local elections, the percentage of ethnic minority candidates on their lists was 
calculated. Candidates’ ethnic origin was coded based on information found on party, candidate 
and news websites, complemented by information about the geographic distribution of their 
names (see Janssen et al. (2020) for a similar approach). Candidates of non-European, Southern-
European and Eastern-European origin were defined as ethnic minority candidates. Due to the 
right skewness of this variable (Appendix 4), the presence of ethnic minority candidates is 
measured by means of a dummy variable indication whether (N=252) or not (N=223) ethnic 
minority candidates were present. Finally, at the district level, the size of the ethnic minority 
population (Stad Antwerpen, 2020; Statistiek Vlaanderen, 2020) is taken into account as a 
control variable. 
4.3 Statistical tests 
To estimate the selection of the ethnic minority aspirants, this paper relies on fractional 
logit regression models. These type of models are highly suited to predict the values of 
proportional data between the open interval (0,1). As the dependent variable in this paper 
captures the proportion of selected ethnic minority aspirants, the values range from 0 (no ethnic 
minority aspirants were selected) to one (all four ethnic minority candidates were selected). 
Alternative approaches such as beta-regressions or zero- or one-inflated beta models therefore 
cannot be used as they do not allow to take both values of zero and one into account.  
The analyses below are based on the entire sample, but additional robustness checks were 
conducted to control for a potential social desirability bias. The robustness checks excluded 
those respondents who did not answer the content question correctly, those who violated the 
gender quotas and those who guessed that the research objective was to measure their reaction 
to the information provided in the hypothetical articles. When differences emerged between the 
models based on the entire sample and the robustness checks, this is discussed in the text. 
5 Results 
A comparison between the different treatment groups reveals that in all groups on average 
50% of the ethnic minority aspirants were selected (2 out of 4). Party selectors in the control 
group selected on average 44.85% of the ethnic minority aspirants, whereas those assigned to 
the ‘competition treatment’ selected 48.45% and those assigned to the ‘emulation treatment’ 
selected 48.53%. Figure 1 shows that participants assigned to the control group more often 
selected zero or only one ethnic minority aspirant and less frequently nominated more than one 
ethnic minority aspirant than the participants assigned to the competition or ‘emulation 
treatment’. A one-way ANOVA test showed that these differences are statistically significant 
at the p<0.1 level (F(2) = 2.538, p<.1) and a post hoc Tukey HSD test showed that the 
differences between the control and emulation group are statistically significant (p<0.1). 
FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE OF ETHNIC MINORITY (EM) ASPIRANTS SELECTED, PER 
TREATMENT GROUP 
 
A fractional regression model (Table 1) estimating the proportion of selected ethnic 
minority aspirants shows that participants assigned to the ‘competition’ or ‘emulation’ 
treatment selected slightly more ethnic minority aspirants than the participants assigned to the 
control group, although the differences are only significant for the ‘emulation’ treatment and 
solely at the p<0.1 level. Furthermore, the ideological position of the party has a significant 
negative effect on the proportion of selected ethnic minority aspirants. Party chairs of rightist 
selected less ethnic minority aspirants than participants of leftist successful parties. Party chairs 
whose party obtained a vote share of more than 30% equally selected less ethnic minority 
aspirants than party chairs whose party obtained less than 11% of the votes. The size of the 
ethnic minority population has a significant positive effect, which means that party chairs from 
more diverse municipalities selected more ethnic minority aspirants than party chairs running 
in less diverse municipalities. The robustness check confirmed the effects of the party 
characteristics, but the effect of the emulation dummy variable became statistically 
insignificant. Whilst the results thus seem to refute the role of diffusion as a dominant 
explanation for parties’ diversifying strategies, they suggest that parties in general are 
somewhat responsive to normative calls concerning the representation of ethnic minorities 
(emulation) thereby providing limited support for hypothesis 1. The results furthermore mirror 
previous findings that parties’ ideological position and the ethnic composition of the electorate 
are primary explanations for the selection of ethnic minority candidates (Bird et al., 2011; 
Dancygier, 2017; Geese & Schacht, 2018; Tolley, 2019).  
TABLE 1. FRACTIONAL REGRESSION MODEL ESTIMATING THE PERCENTAGE OF ETHNIC 
MINORITY ASPIRANTS SELECTED 
 b (SE) 
Intercept 0.39 (0.15)** 
Treatment (ref. control)  
Competition 0.09 (0.09) 
Emulation 0.16 (0.09) ^ 
Party’s ideological position  -0.19 (0.03) *** 
Party’s vote share in 2018 (ref. =<10%)  
11-20% 0.06 (0.10) 
21-30% -0.05 (0.13) 
>30% -0.22 (0.13) ^ 
Ethnic minority candidates selected by party in 2018 (ref. not 
selected) 
-0.03 (0.08) 
% ethnic minority population  0.02 (0.00) *** 
Adjusted D squared 0.12 
N 468 
Notes: Significant codes: p<0.001=***, p<0.01=**, p<0.05=*, p<0.1=^. 
To test hypotheses 2 to 4, three additional fractional regression models were computed, 
each including an interaction term between the treatment variable and one of the party 
characteristics at stake. Model 1 confirms the significant effect of the ideological position of 
the participants’ local party, but the interaction effects are statistically insignificant. The 
robustness check provided the same results. Model 2 shows a significant effect of the 
competition dummy, but again the interaction effects are statistically insignificant. However, in 
the robustness check of Model 2, which omitted the participants who did not answer the content 
question correct, who did not comply with the gender quota legislation and who guessed the 
objective of the experiment, the interaction effect between participants assigned to the 
‘competition treatment’ and participants with a vote share higher than 30% (as opposed to those 
with a vote share lower than 11%) was statistically significant (p<0.01, results not shown). 
Finally, Model 3 shows that whether or not the participants’ party selected EM candidates in 
the past does not have a significant influence on the selection of ethnic minority aspirants and 
neither do the Treatment variable and the interaction terms. The robustness check confirmed 
these results. In sum, Model 1 and 2 suggest that there might be some interaction effects 
between the experimental conditions and the ideological position and vote share of the local 
parties. However, as the interaction effects are conditional rather than independent effects, it is 
necessary to look beyond the results presented in Table 2. 
TABLE 2. FRACTIONAL REGRESSION MODEL ESTIMATING THE PERCENTAGE OF ETHNIC 
MINORITY (EM) ASPIRANTS SELECTED 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Intercept 0.39 (0.23) 0.31 (0.18) ^ 0.39 (0.16) * 
Treatment (ref. control)    
Competition 0.46 (0.30) 0.39 (0.20) * 0.07 (0.13) 
Emulation 0.03 (0.28) 0.14 (0.19) 0.21 (0.13) 






Party’s vote share in 2018 (ref. <10%)    
11-20% 0.04 (0.10) 0.14 (0.19) 0.06 (0.10) 
21-30% -0.07 (0.13) 0.07 (0.18) -0.05 (0.13) 
>30% -0.24 (0.13) ^ -0.06 (0.21) -0.22 (0.13) ^ 
EM selected by party in 2018 (ref. not 
selected) 
-0.02 (0.08) -0.02 (0.09) -0.01 (0.14) 






Competition x Ideological position -0.09 (0.07)   
Emulation x Ideological position 0.03 (0.07)   
Competition x Vote share 11-20%  -0.38 (0.25)  
Competition x Vote share 21-30%  -0.34 (0.29)  
Competition x Vote share >30%  -0.42 (0.29)  
Emulation x Vote share 11-20%  0.12 (0.25)  
Emulation x Vote share 21-30%  -0.05 (0.28)  
Emulation x Vote share >30%  -0.09 (0.28)  
Competition x EM selected   0.03 (0.19) 
Emulation x EM not selected   -0.09 (0.18) 
Adjusted D squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 
N 468 468 468 
Notes: Significant codes: p<0.001=***, p<0.01=**, p<0.05=*, p<0.1=^. 
Figure 1 shows how the interaction effects play out. The first and third plot are based on 
the fractional regression model depicted in Table 2 (N=468). The second plot is based on the 
robustness check (N=431) considering that the results were more outspoken there than in the 
general model, as discussed above. The first plot shows that among the participants which were 
assigned to the ‘competition’ treatment, the more rightist participants perceived their local 
party, the less ethnic minority aspirants were selected. For the other treatments, the differences 
between participants belonging to the most leftist and most rightist parties are also statistically 
significant, although the overall effects are less outspoken. An additional plot was build based 
on a similar fractional regression model as depicted in Model 1 (Table 2), but in which the 
parties’ ideological position was replaced by the regional party affiliation of the local party 
branches. The results are included in Appendix 5 and confirm that a clear left-right difference 
is present among the respondents assigned to the ‘competition’ treatment. Therefore, hypothesis 
2 is supported for competition but not for emulation. The second plot shows that there are 
significant differences between the participants who were assigned to the ‘competition’ 
treatment. Participants whose party only obtained a small vote share in 2018 (=<10%) selected 
significantly more ethnic minority aspirants than participants whose party enjoyed great 
electoral success (>30%). Again, hypothesis 3 is partially confirmed. Finally, the third plot 
confirms that the effect of whether the party of the participants selected ethnic minority 
candidates in the previous elections in 2018 did not differ between the experimental treatments. 
Hypothesis 4 is therefore rejected. 
FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF ETHNIC MINORITY (EM) ASPIRANTS SELECTED, PER 
TREATMENT GROUP AND PARTY TYPE 
 
Notes: First and third plot based on the entire sample (N=468); second plot based on the robustness check 
(N=431). Marginal effects based on fractional regression models. Other continuous predictors are held constant 
at their mean. For categoric predictors, the proportions of the categories are averaged. 95% confidence intervals 
shown. 
Finally, it was examined whether the size of the ethnic minority population influences 
parties’ responsiveness to diffusion pressures. To start, the differences between how 
participants belonging to more leftist and more rightist parties responded to the competition 
treatment remained statistically significant  in both less and more diverse municipalities (results 
not shown), which provides further support for hypotheses 2. Additionally, when computing a 
fractional logit regression including a three-way interaction between the treatment group, 
parties’ vote share and the size of the ethnic minority population, it appears that the difference 
between participants belonging to the least and most successful parties is only statistically 
significant in municipalities where ethnic minorities constitute approximately 5-15% of the 
population (Figure 3). The vast majority of the participants stemmed from these municipalities 
(Appendix 4), which explained why an overall significant effect was found between the least 
and most successful parties in Figure 2. This nuances the confirmation of H3, as in highly 
diverse municipalities, there is no significant difference between participants belonging to less 
and more electorally successful parties. At last, there were no significant differences between 
participants whose party selected ethnic minority candidates in the previous elections and 
parties whose party did not select ethnic minority in the previous elections. 
FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF ETHNIC MINORITY ASPIRANTS SELECTED, PER TREATMENT 
GROUP, PARTIES’ VOTE SHARE AND SIZE OF THE ETHNIC MINORITY POPULATION 
Notes: Plot based on the robustness check (N=431). Marginal effects based on fractional regression models. Other 
continuous predictors are held constant at their mean. For categoric predictors, the proportions of the categories 
are averaged. 95% confidence intervals shown. 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
Departing from previous studies establishing how diffusion has increased the 
representation of women on candidate lists, this paper tested whether similar mechanisms affect 
the selection of ethnic minority candidates. To these ends, a survey experiment was conducted 
among Flemish local party chairs in which they were first presented one of three hypothetical 
newspaper articles, after which they were asked to compose a candidate list out of a fixed pool 
of aspirants. The newspaper article discussed the electoral success which other parties in the 
participant’s municipality enjoyed in the 2018 local elections due to the presence of ethnic 
minority candidates (‘competition’ treatment), the democratic norms associated with a diverse 
candidate list rather than its electoral consequences (‘emulation’ treatment), or the campaign 
expenses of local parties (control group).  
The results, however, provided limited evidence of diffusion patterns. To start, there was 
a general, although limited, effect of the emulation treatment across the participants. Party 
selectors thus appear to be slightly responsive to broader calls to comply with democratic 
norms. Alternatively, the effect of the competition treatment was dependent on several party 
characteristics. Participants belonging to leftist parties selected significantly more ethnic 
minority aspirants than participants belonging to rightist parties when assigned to the 
‘competition’ treatment. Participants belonging to parties who were least electorally successful 
in the previous real-life local elections selected significantly more ethnic minority aspirants 
than participants whose parties were most successful in the previous elections, but only in 
moderately diverse municipalities. In highly diverse municipalities, there was no statistically 
significant difference between participants belonging to less and more successful parties.  
Why is it that diffusion only appears to play a minor role in parties’ decision to select 
ethnic minority candidates? On the one hand, it is plausible that some characteristics of the 
experiment led to an underestimation of diffusion effects. It is in this regard remarkable that the 
candidate lists across all experimental conditions were highly diverse. An average list 
comprised 21.08% ethnic minority candidates. This figure stands in sharp contrast to the pool 
of candidates running in the 2018 local elections for local branches of regional parties 
(including cartel lists). An examination of these candidate lists shows that an average candidate 
list counted 3.99% ethnic minority candidates. Considering that in 2018, 16.58% of the Flemish 
population has an ethnic minority background (Statistiek Vlaanderen, 2020), ethnic minority 
candidates were strongly under-represented in the 2018 elections, but over-represented in the 
experiment. Of course, the low hypothetical district magnitude of the experimental condition 
plays a role here as the list could only contain nine candidates, which implies that selecting only 
one ethnic minority candidate means that already 11.11% of the selected candidates had an 
ethnic minority background. In real life, however, local candidate lists can include on average 
24,66 candidates and thus a larger number of ethnic minority candidates is required before 
similar percentages can be reached. It can nevertheless be presumed that other factors are at 
stake as well. 
A potential explanation is that social desirability effects are at play. The visibility of the 
ethnic minority aspirants could have triggered the respondents to include a fair number of ethnic 
minority candidates on their lists out of fear of being perceived as conservative, maybe even 
racist selectors. If this were true, however, we should have found more outspoken differences 
between the general models and the robustness checks. Furthermore, if an outspoken social 
desirability bias would be at play, the ethnic diversity of all candidate lists should have been 
high, whereas we still found significant differences between, for instance, leftist and rightist 
parties and parties running in more and less diverse municipalities, findings which are in line 
with previous work.  
More plausible is that many participants selected a high number of ethnic minority 
candidates because they were open for more political diversity and were presented with an 
(unrealistically) high supply of ethnic minority aspirants, amounting to 20% of the available 
aspirants (4 out of 20), which enabled the participants to easily diversify their lists. Especially 
in the Flemish local context, where parties have shown to be open to group representation, as 
testified by the adoption of far-reaching party and legal gender quota (Meier, 2004), and where 
both ethnic minority and majority voters support ethnic minority candidates (Teney, Jacobs, 
Rea, & Delwit, 2010), it is presumable that party selectors are willing to select ethnic minority 
aspirants when they present themselves. However, when ethnic minority aspirants are not 
present, party selectors need to actively recruit them before they can diversify their lists. 
Considering that party selectors’ traditional recruiting networks generally do not include (a fair 
share of) ethnic minority aspirants (Tolley, 2019), the associated costs with recruiting potential 
ethnic minority candidates is higher. Therefore, party selectors might need extra incentives 
before making these investments. Such incentives can include gained knowledge about the 
electoral gains other parties have enjoyed due to the selection of ethnic minority candidates or 
how other parties have improved their party image by doing so. It is thus reasonable to suggest 
that diffusion patterns will be more outspoken in contexts where the supply of ethnic minority 
aspirants is smaller. If so, an important element is missing from current diffusion studies, which 
have thus far overlooked the importance of candidate supply. 
On the other hand, there are reasons to assume that the experiment rightly indicated that 
diffusion only has a minor effect on the selection of ethnic minority candidates. To start, it could 
be that for stronger emulation effects to occur, more widespread, even international, pressures 
need to be present. Previous research has, for instance, shown that the diffusion of female 
candidacies was not only triggered by individual innovating parties, but also benefited from 
broader calls for more gender equality in politics (Cowell-Meyers, 2011; Huang, 2015). To 
date, similar international movements advocating a better political inclusion of ethnic 
minorities are absent.  
Finally, perhaps it is possible that the diffusion of ethnic minority candidacies in general 
is less outspoken than the diffusion of female candidacies. When deciding whether to select 
ethnic minority candidates (and if so, which candidates) parties need to find a balance between 
attracting ethnic minority voters and potentially losing ethnocentric ethnic majority voters. 
These inclusion dilemmas strongly differ between parties and between contexts (Dancygier, 
2017), which makes it harder for parties to make plausible inferences about the potential 
consequences of diversifying selection strategies based on other parties’ experiences with 
similar strategies. Additionally, in highly diverse municipalities, party selectors may primarily 
rely on the size of the ethnic minority population to estimate the potential electoral success of 
selecting ethnic minority candidates rather than to rely on other parties’ strategies. In the 
regression analyses presented in this paper, for instance, the proportion of the ethnic minority 
population consistently had a strong positive effect on the selection of ethnic minority aspirants. 
Party selectors’ decision to select ethnic minority candidates may therefore be more influenced 
by the broader context than their decisions to select female candidates, as women are evenly 
spread across electoral districts.  
Although at this stage no clear answers can be provided to these issues, this study suggests 
that diffusion has a smaller effect on the representation of ethnic minorities than it has (had) on 
the representation of women. It calls for future research to examine the diffusion of ethnic 
minority candidacies in other contexts, and how aspirant supply affects the diffusion of 
candidate selection strategies. Attention should thereby be granted to how diffusion affects their 
numerical presence as well as the list positions ethnic minority candidates are assigned to. These 
insights will greatly enhance the scholarly understanding of how the interdependence between 
political parties shapes the political under-representation of ethnic minorities.  
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8 Appendices 
Appendix 1. Response rates per party 
Political party N  Response rate (%) 
PVDA (Far-left) 9 33.33 
Groen (Greens) 142 42.90 
sp.a (Socialists) 100 40.32 
CD&V (Christian democrats) 116 38.80 
Open VLD (Liberals) 133 36.44 
N-VA (Regionalists) 115 39.52 
 
Appendix 2. Overview newspaper articles 
1. Learning treatment 
‘Wednesday 17 October 2018 – by L.B. 
Diversity has success in “Municipality_respondent” 
In last week’s local elections in “Municipality_respondent”, two parties competed for the 
support of the local population with candidate lists which included a notable number of 
candidates of Maghrebi origin. Partly because these candidates were able to attract a new group 
of voters, the vote share of the two parties increased significantly. Furthermore, the candidates 
of Maghrebi origin also obtained high personal scores. They received preferential votes from 
both voters with and without an immigration background.’ 
2. Emulation treatment 
‘Tuesday 2 October 2018 – by L.B. 
Diversity on candidate lists in “Municipality_respondent” 
Next week Sunday in “Municipality_respondent”, two parties will compete for the 
support of the local population with a notable number of candidates of Maghrebi origin on their 
list. The party chairs of both parties emphasize the democratic importance of their choice. One 
of them elucidated their decision as follows: ‘For us, it is evident that we include candidates of 
Maghrebi origin on our lists. As a political party, we have the moral obligation to mirror the 
composition of the population and to defend the interests of all citizens, including citizens of 
foreign origin.’’ 
3. Control group 
‘Tuesday 2 October 2018 – by L.B. 
Campaign expenses under maximum threshold 
Since the beginning of the ‘sperperiode’4 on 1 July 2018, political parties are bounded by 
the double threshold for campaign expenses. Each candidate list is subjected to maximum 
budgets they can spend on the collective campaign and on the campaign of individual 
candidates. In the past, it has, however, become clear that local party lists spend less on their 
electoral campaign than these maximum thresholds. On average, they spend about €1 per 
citizen. Lists affiliated with a national party can nevertheless benefit from the campaign budgets 
reserved for the national campaign.' 
Appendix 3. Survey design 
Please read the following hypothetical newspaper. To ensure that you read it carefully, 
the ‘next’-button which leads you to the next step in this survey will only appear after 30 
seconds. 
[Random newspaper article shown.] 
-- page break – 
Imagine the hypothetical situation that local elections will take place in a few months’ 
time. We ask you to compose a candidate list for your local party which consists of nine 
candidates. You are requested to respect the legal gender quota.  
You can chose from 20 hypothetical candidates with varying profiles, which you can find 
below. Candidates with an identical profile are interchangeable. A choice for ‘Veerle, active 
party member’ on list position 3 is, for instance, the same as a choice for ‘Liesbeth, active party 
member’ on list position 3 (these examples are not included in the list below). 
The information about the candidates and the number of candidates you are requested to 
select is restricted. The situation presented here is thus a simplified version of the reality. We 
ask you to compose your candidate list as truthfully as possible. There are no wrong answers.  
The candidates are presented in alphabetical order.  
- Anna, active party member  
                                                 
4 A period of time in which certain restrictions are imposed.  
- Bart, incumbent 
- Charlotte, active party member 
- Fatima, active party member 
- Filip, active party member 
- Isabelle, active party member 
- Jeroen, active party member 
- Julie, incumbent 
- Kristof, active party member 
- Laura, active party member 
- Marie, active party member 
- Nathalie, incumbent 
- Omar, active party member 
- Pieter, active party member 
- Samira, active party member 
- Sofie, active party member 
- Stefaan, incumbent 
- Thomas, active party member 
- Wouter, active party member 
- Youssef, active party member  
Appendix 4. Distribution of numeric predictor variables 
 
Appendix 5. Percentage of ethnic minority aspirants selected, per treatment 
group and party affiliation 
 
Notes: Plot based on the entire sample (N=468). Marginal effects based on fractional regression model. Other 
continuous predictors are held constant at their mean. For categoric predictors, the proportions of the categories 
are averaged. 95% confidence intervals shown. 
 
